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Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Scalia stated in the majority opinion in Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, Inc.1 that “Congress. . . does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”2
This statement promotes the idea that if Congress intended to make a
significant change to a statute and the implications of the statute, it would
not do so in a way that is mysterious and unpronounced.3 In Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,4 the Supreme Court of the United
States had to determine congressional intent when Congress altered the
definition of the word “state” for the purposes of Bankruptcy Code.5 The
provision that is the center of the question presented is Section 903(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which states:
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a state to control,
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the
exercise of the political or governmental powers of such
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but . . . a
State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent
to such composition . . . .6
In his oral argument, Christopher Landau, the attorney for the
petitioners, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Melba Acosta-Febo,
advanced the position that both views of the amended definition of “state”
would create an “elephant-in-a-mousehole” situation.7 The petitioners
argued that Congress would not have left Puerto Rico without any recourse
for adjusting their municipal debts without expressly saying so.8 However,
the respondents stated that Congress would not have provided Puerto Rico
1. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
2. Id at 468.
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S.
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
4. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) [hereinafter Puerto Rico].
5. Id at 1942.
6. 11 U.S.C.A. § 903(1) (West through P.L. 114-219); see Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S.
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
8. See id at 6-7.
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with the right to enact their own bankruptcy debts, while denying that right
to every other state.9 Upon consideration of both of these arguments, the
Supreme Court of the United States held in a 5-2 decision that Section
903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to Puerto Rico within the definition
of the word “state.”10 As such, the Court determined that Congress left
Puerto Rico without any recourse for restructuring its debts.11
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Corporation Debt
Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act).12 This Act helps the Public
Utilities of Puerto Rico implement a restructuring plan for their debts so
they will not default.13 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico finds itself in
the midst of climbing financial woes, as more than $20 billion of its debt
can be attributed to three government-owned public utilities companies.14
These companies are: the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority; the Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority; and the Puerto Rico Highways and
Transportation Authority.15 Upon creating these government-owned public
utilities, the relevant legislation allowed the companies to issue bonds to
operate the companies.16 By implementing the Puerto Rico Corporation
Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, the Commonwealth passed legislation
replicating Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.17 Specifically, Chapter 2 of
the Recovery Act creates a procedure for “consensual” modification of
debts where the public utilities can propose changes to the terms of their
outstanding debt instruments.18 Furthermore, in addition to proposing debt
modification, the utility must propose a bank-approved recovery plan to
regain financial stability.19 This modification will be binding if those who
hold at least 50% of the affected debt agree to the modifications.20 After the
Act was enacted into law, Franklin Templeton and Oppenheimer financial
firms sued the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, specific Commonwealth
9. See id. at 27-28.
10. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
11. Id. at 1954.
12. Id. at 1943.
13. Appellate Brief of the Defendants-Appellants Melba Acosta-Febo at 7, Franklin California
Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1218, 15-1221,
15-1271, 15-1272).
14. Id.
15. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
16. Appellate Brief of the Defendants-Appellants Melba Acosta-Febo at 11, Franklin California
Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1218, 15-1221,
15-1271, 15-1272).
17. Id. at 5.
18. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1943.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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officials, and the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”).21
Subsequently, BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC sued the
Commonwealth’s governor and other officials.22 Franklin Templeton and
Oppenheimer sought a declaration that the Recovery Act was preempted by
the Federal Bankruptcy Code.23
BlueMountain alleged that “any
prospective enforcement of” the Act would violate the Contract Clause of
the Puerto Rico Constitution, go against the Bankruptcy and Contract
Clauses of the federal Constitution, and be preempted by federal law.24 The
District Court then consolidated the cases and issued a decision.25 In its
decision, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held
that the federal Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act, and
as such, is void pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.26
The District Court permanently enjoined the
Commonwealth from implementing the Recovery Act.27 The decision of
the District Court was appealed.28 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision.29 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals wrote, “The prohibition now codified at Section 903(1)
has applied to Puerto Rico since the predecessor of that section’s enactment
in 1946. The statute does not currently read, nor does anything about the
1984 amendment suggest, that Puerto Rico is outside the reach of Section
903(1)’s prohibitions.”30 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.31
III. THE COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, with whom Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan

21. Appellate Brief of the Defendants-Appellants Melba Acosta-Febo at 5, Franklin California
Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1218, 15-1221,
15-1271, 15-1272).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577,
586 (D.P.R. 2015).
26. Id. at 613.
27. Id.
28. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d at 325.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1941.
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joined.32 Justice Alito took no part in the consideration of the case.33 The
majority opinion began by discussing the relevant bankruptcy provisions,
focusing on three main provisions: the “who may be a debtor” provision in
Section 109(c), the pre-emption provision in Section 903(1), and the
definition of “state” in Section 101(52).34 Justice Thomas began by looking
at the text and history of these provisions, first by citing the Constitution,
which empowers Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”35 Further, Justice Thomas
stated that Congress entered into the field of municipal bankruptcy in
1933.36 The Supreme Court struck down Congress’ first attempt at creating
municipal bankruptcy law, the Court stated that Congress infringed on the
States’ power to, “manage their own affairs.”37 Justice Thomas asserted
that it is critical to the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy laws that
the State has the first say in authorizing the entity to seek relief.38 However,
the states do not enjoy unlimited power; in a 1946 amendment, Congress
made it so that federal bankruptcy laws preempt state municipal bankruptcy
laws.39 Finally, discussing the provision defining a “state,” in 1984
Congress amended the definition of the word “state” to say that “the term
‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the
purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”40 It
is uncontested that, before 1984, Puerto Rico was a “state” for the purpose
of Chapter 9’s preemption provision; accordingly, before 1984, the
Bankruptcy Code would have preempted the Recovery Act, because it was a
state law that would restructure debts that would bind non-consenting
creditors.41
The majority held that the respondents had a better
interpretation of § 903(1).42 Justice Thomas stated quite simply that the text
of the Bankruptcy Code is both the beginning and end of the analysis.43 He
went on to state that, “The amended definition of ‘State’ excludes Puerto
Rico for the single ‘purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter
9 of this title.’ That exception unmistakably refers to the gateway provision

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
(1936)).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1944.
Id. (citing US CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4).
Id.
Id. (citing Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 531
Id.
Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1945.
Id. at 1943 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(52) (West through P.L. 114-254)).
Id. at 1945.
Id.
Id. at 1946.
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in § 109, titled ‘who may be a debtor.’”44 However, while Puerto Rico is
not a state for defining who may be a debtor; that does not mean that Puerto
Rico is excluded from all Chapter 9 provisions.45 The exclusion from
defining debtors is simply that—an exclusion—but it does not bar Puerto
Rico from any other provisions contained in the Bankruptcy Code.46 Justice
Thomas argued that “The text of the definition extends no further.”47 Next,
the majority opinion discussed the arguments made in the dissenting
opinion.48 The first of these arguments is that if Puerto Rico is excluded
from the gateway provision, this is the gateway into Chapter 9, and if Puerto
Rico is excluded from the gateway provision, it follows that the
Commonwealth is excluded from Chapter 9 in its entirety.49 However, this
argument was not well taken by the majority. Specifically, Justice Thomas
argued:
That Puerto Rico is not a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway
provision, however, says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is a
‘State’ for the other provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States.
The States do not ‘pass through’ the gateway provision. The
gateway provision is instead directed at the debtors themselves—
the municipalities, in the case of Chapter 9 bankruptcy. A
municipality that cannot secure state authorization to file a Chapter
9 provision is excluded from Chapter 9 entirely. But the same
cannot be said about the State in which that municipality is
located.50
Further, the majority held that the gateway provision only provides for
which states can authorize municipalities to file for bankruptcy; it is not a
requirement to enter into Chapter 9 as a whole.51 The court stated, “If it
were Congress’ intent to also exclude Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes
of that pre-emption provision, it would have said so.”52

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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Id.
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2. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg, issued the
dissenting opinion.53 The dissent began by stating, “The structure of the
Code and the language and purpose of § 903 demonstrate that Puerto Rico’s
municipal debt restructuring law should not be read to be prohibited by
Chapter 9.”54 The dissent took note of the financial crisis in Puerto Rico,
noting the importance of bankruptcy law for debtors to get a “fresh start.”55
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor noted that a business corporation can try to
use bankruptcy as a means of reorganization, but if the reorganization were
to fail, the corporation could default and go out of business.56 However, this
is not a possibility for public utilities, as they provide water, electricity, and
transportation to the public.57 If they were to default and shut down, it
would leave the public to have to find these necessities for themselves.58
The dissent then discussed the structure of the Bankruptcy Code, noting that
it is to be read in its entirety starting with Chapter 1.59 Chapter 1 lays out
how to read the Code by stating definitions and rules of construction.60
Specifically, the Court noted that § 109, the “who may be a debtor”
provision, details for each type of debtor which chapter they should follow
for filing for bankruptcy, therefore gaining the title of the “gateway”
provision.61 Following this logic, because a municipality in Puerto Rico
cannot be authorized to file for municipal bankruptcy, the dissent argued
that it followed that Puerto Rico would not access Chapter 9 because
Chapter 1 states which chapter a debtor is to use, and Puerto Rico cannot
use Chapter 9.62 Further, the dissent articulated:
The question in these cases is whether § 903(1), a pre-emption
provision in Chapter 9, still applies to Puerto Rico even though its
municipalities are not eligible to pass through the ‘gateway’ into
Chapter 9. It should not. Section 903 by its terms presupposes that
Chapter 9 applies only to States who have the power to authorize
their municipalities to invoke its protection.63

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1941.
Id. at 1949.
Id. at 1950.
Id.
Id.
Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1950.
Id. at 1951.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1952.
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Additionally, the dissent argued that Section 903 is to be read in context, in
order to see why it does not preempt the Recovery Act.64 As mentioned
above, Section 903 provides for a reservation of powers for the States;
however, the states are limited in their power, as “a State law prescribing a
method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind
any creditor that does not consent to such composition.”65 The dissent
stated that this provision does not apply to Puerto Rico under the gateway
provision.66 Specifically, “This understanding of § 903 is fundamentally
confirmed by the careful gateway structure the Code sets out for
understanding how its chapters work together.”67 The dissent placed
significant importance upon the need to read the statutes in the context of
the overall statutory scheme.68 Finally, the dissent addressed the majority’s
argument that if Congress had intended to exclude Puerto Rico from
Chapter 9 altogether, it would have said so.69 Notably, the dissent proffered
a sticking point for this argument:
[T]he Court ignores that Congress already altered the fundamental
details of municipal bankruptcy when it amended the definition of
‘State’ to exclude Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to
take advantage of Chapter 9. Nobody has presented a compelling
reason for why Congress would have done so, and the legislative
history of the amendment is unhelpful. Under either interpretation
the scheme has been fundamentally altered by Congress.70
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

In Puerto Rico v. Franklin Tax-Free Trust, the Supreme Court of the
United States was presented with the issue of whether Puerto Rico could
implement its own municipal bankruptcy laws, or if it was limited to
seeking relief from Congress.71 The Court focused solely on the text of the
Bankruptcy Code in making its decision.72 Notably, there is no legislative
history to be offered for the relevant provisions, and as such, the Court was

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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limited to its reading of the text alone.73 During oral arguments, Justice
Kagan stated that each side had a story as to what Congress intended to do
in section 903(1).74 She indicated, “Both of you [counsel for respondents
and petitioners] have stories about this, and it’s not—just not clear which of
you is right. And I guess what I most want to think about is this text.”75 As
demonstrated by the majority and dissenting opinions, the reading of the
text could result in varying outcomes.76 The reading of the text called for a
careful balance of congressional intent in addition to a consideration of
federalism. Ultimately, the majority found that Congress would not have
intended to give Puerto Rico a right that the states did not have, but rather
Congress would have intended to put more of a limit on the Commonwealth
and maintain control over the fiscal problems it faced.77
The precedent set by this case may have some significance in future
statutory interpretation cases as the majority rejected the statutory scheme
argument and focused solely on the relevant provisions in isolation.
Furthermore, beyond the notable precedential possibilities, the decision in
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Tax-Free Trust could raise important federalism
questions. The decision also has a significant impact on what happens next
in Puerto Rico.78
B. Analysis
1. Two Conflicting Views of Statutory Interpretation
Both the majority and the dissent in this case focused on the text of the
relevant statutory provisions.79 However, they each came to different
conclusions regarding whether Puerto Rico was bound by the preemption
provision in § 903(1).80 The majority adopted a narrow view of the
definition of the definition of “state.”81 The majority cited Chamber of
Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, where the Court stated,
“When a federal law contains an express preemption clause, we ‘focus on
the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best
evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.’”82 Based upon the narrow
73. Id. at 1953-54.
74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S.
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
75. Id.
76. See generally Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1938.
77. Id. at 1949.
78. Id. at 1954.
79. See id. at 1946, 1951.
80. See id. at 1949, 1954.
81. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1946.
82. Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011)
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
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reading of the text of the definition of “state” in § 101(52), the Court
concluded that the definition only excludes Puerto Rico from defining who
may be a debtor, but does not exclude Puerto Rico from the preemption
provision.83 The majority did not give much weight to reading the
Bankruptcy Code as a statutory scheme, and in fact, stated that while,
“Puerto Rico is not a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway provision,
however, says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ for the other
provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States.”84 During oral arguments,
Christopher Landau, the attorney for the petitioners, described the statutory
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code as a “decision tree.”85 Mr. Landau
explained that § 903(1) should not be read in isolation, but rather is better
understood with the “decision tree” explanation.86 This explanation of how
to read the Bankruptcy code begins with reading the definition provided in §
101(52).87 After reading that definition, it sends the reader to § 109(c)(2),
known as the gateway provision, which states that Puerto Rico is not a
“state” in terms of authorizing municipalities to enter into Chapter 9.88 At
this point, applying the suggested reasoning, the reader would determine
that the “gateway”‘ is closed to Puerto Rico.89 Then, when the reader would
move on to § 903, it would be understood that it does not apply to Puerto
Rico, because Puerto Rico was barred from passing through the “gateway”
to Chapter 9.90 By adopting the decision tree explanation, it requires both a
reading of the text and a consideration of what Congress intended when
they amended the definition of “state” in 1984. The dissent’s reading of the
statutory text adopted the “decision tree” explanation.91 Specifically, the
dissent considered the purpose of bankruptcy law.92 “Bankruptcy is not a
one-size-fits-all process. The Federal Bankruptcy Code sets out specific
procedures and governing law for each type of entity that seeks bankruptcy
protection.”93 Additionally, the dissent took into account the impact this
decision would have on the Commonwealth’s future.94 By finding that
Congress intended to subject Puerto Rico to the preemption provision, the
83. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1947.
84. Id.
85. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S.
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S.
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
91. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1949.
92. Id. at 1950.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1954.
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Commonwealth is left with no choice as to how to restructure their debt,
except for waiting for the aid to come from Congress.95 As stated:
Congress could step in to resolve Puerto Rico’s crisis. But, in the
interim, the government and people of Puerto Rico should not have
to wait for possible congressional action to avert the consequences
of unreliable electricity, transportation, and safe water—
consequences that members of the Executive and Legislature have
described as a looming ‘humanitarian crisis.’96
This difference in statutory construction is a display of the distinction
between textualist and purposivist ideologies. Notably, this decision raises
questions as to whether the court would employ a textualist approach in the
event that there were more harsh results. However, while the future
implications of the Court’s decision are not easily identifiable, it is
important to acknowledge the Court’s choice to employ a strict textualist
approach to the reading of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with a question of
statutory construction in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental
Protection Agency.97 In that case, the Court was to determine whether the
general term of “air pollutant” maintained its general definition throughout
the operative sections of the statute, or whether a narrower definition
applied in different sections of the statute.98 The Court held that it was
reasonable for the EPA to adopt a narrower definition of the term in
different sections of the statute.99 The Court stated, “As we reiterated the
same day we decided Massachusetts v. EPA, the presumption of consistent
usage, ‘readily yields’ to context, and a statutory term—even one defined in
the statute—’may take on distinct characters from association with distinct
statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.’”100 In this
case, the Court considered a similar question, as to whether the exclusion of
Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 as per the definition of “state” wholly excludes
it from Chapter 9, or whether Puerto Rico is subject to the preemption
provision.101 While the cases are not analogous, the questions of statutory
construction are quite similar. However, the Court’s decision in Puerto
Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust differs from the decision in
Utility Air Regulatory Group in that the majority looked to the provision in
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954.
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014).
See id. at 2439-40.
Id. at 2442.
Id. at 2441.
Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
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question in an isolated manner and applied the definition, but did not find
that a narrower definition may apply.102 While the choice to take a
textualist or purposivist approach is purely ideological, as evidenced by the
difference in results between the two aforementioned cases, the different
results can be quite apparent, without much explanation for the differences.
2. Is the Supreme Court Still Concerned with Federalism
Surrounding Chapter 9?
“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Bankruptcy Clause does not prevent States and
Territories from enacting their own laws governing the restructuring of
debts.”103 Congress first enacted legislation in 1934 to govern debts of
municipalities.104 However, the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down the initial legislation.105 “In light of the background principles of
federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck
down the law on the ground that Congress’ constitutional power over
bankruptcy did not extend to this context.”106 The Supreme Court was
concerned with preserving states’ rights when it came to municipal
bankruptcy.107 In 1934, Congress implemented a bankruptcy law that was
upheld by the Supreme Court.108 In United States v. Bekins, the Supreme
Court of the United States considered the new 1934 bankruptcy law.109
Specifically, the Court stated, “The statute is carefully drawn so as not to
impinge upon the sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its
fiscal affairs. . .It is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make
contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental
power.”110 Notably, the Supreme Court was concerned with preserving
sovereignty and was not in favor of a wide sweeping preemption, meaning
that the Court did not want federal bankruptcy law to always preempt state
laws.111 In Faitoute Iron Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, N.J.,112 the Court
explained that the municipal bankruptcy laws were not to be so wide
102. Id. at 1946.
103. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 1, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218).
104. Id.
105. See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530.
106. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 1, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Ashton, 298 U.S. at 529-32).
107. See, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530.
108. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1938).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 21, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218).
112. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
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reaching as to supersede state laws regarding restructuring municipal
debt.113 The Court stated:
Can it be that a power that was not recognized until 1938, and when
so recognized, was carefully circumscribed to reserve full freedom
to the states, has now been completely absorbed by the federal
government—that a state which. . .has. . ..devised elaborate
machinery for the autonomous regulation of problems as peculiarly
local as the fiscal management of its own household, is powerless in
this field? We think not.114
It is the purpose of the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to establish a division in power between the federal
government and state governments.115 In analyzing the Tenth Amendment
in relation to municipal bankruptcy, the Supreme Court has tended to err on
the side of the states’ rights as mentioned above.116 However, this most
recent Supreme Court decision raises a question as to whether maintaining
federalism and reinforcing state sovereignty is still of importance to the
Supreme Court in relation to municipal bankruptcy.
The role of federalism was discussed in the arguments of both the
respondents and the petitioners.117 However, throughout the Court’s
opinion, these issues of federalism were not addressed; additionally, the
Court decided to restrict Puerto Rico’s rights and provide no means of
restructuring its debt with the exception of waiting on congressional
action.118 Justice Sotomayor raised an interesting question to Matthew
McGill, the attorney for the respondent, when she asked, “It’s like the Tenth
Amendment right of States to deal with their municipalities consistent with
the Constitution. Where does that leave—you can make uniformbankruptcy laws, but nothing about that permits you to impair the rights of
States so drastically?”119 This question is an important one, questioning
why Congress can now impinge so greatly upon the rights of Puerto Rico
without stating an intent to do so, and this decision is against the interest of
113. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 21, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218).
114. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1942).
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
116. See, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530; see also Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 508-09.
117. See Appellate Brief of Appellants at 16, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218); see also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938
(2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
118. See Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954.
119. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255).
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federalism as previously stated by the Court as mentioned above.120 Based
on the Court’s decision, it raises a question as to the state of Puerto Rico’s
sovereignty.
3. Puerto Rico’s Future
The Supreme Court handed down the decision in Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust just days after handing down another
opinion that had a significant impact on the Commonwealth.121 Days
earlier, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez
Valle,122 in which it held that the double jeopardy clause bars Puerto Rico
and the United States from both prosecuting a single person for the same
conduct under equivalent criminal laws.123 The Court’s decision “appears
to diminish the constitutional stature that the Puerto Rican government
thought it has had for nearly seven decades.”124 The issue before the Court
was whether under the dual-sovereignty doctrine, Puerto Rico could
successively prosecute crimes in violation of Puerto Rico law.125 The
question does not turn on the ordinary understanding of sovereignty,
“[r]ather the issue is only whether the prosecutorial powers of the two
jurisdictions have independent origins—or, said conversely, whether those
powers derive from the same independent origins.”126
The Court
determined that Puerto Rico and the United States cannot successively
prosecute a single defendant for the same crime, because “the oldest roots of
Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil.”127 These recent Court
decisions have made it abundantly clear what the Court believes the role of
United States territories to be.128 “It is now clear, in the wake of the Court’s
actions in these cases, that the only way for Puerto Rico to gain an equal
stature within the U.S. governmental structure is to seek statehood—a
highly controversial issue among Puerto Ricans.”129 In Puerto Rico v.
Sanchez Valle, the Court stated that it was not diminishing the self-

120. See, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530; see also Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 508-09.
121. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes Left to Congress,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 13, 2016, 2:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-puertoricos-debt-woes-left-to-congress/ [hereinafter Denniston, Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes].
122. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
123. Id. at 1867-68.
124. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Setback for Puerto Rico’s Independent Powers,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 9, 2016, 2:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-setbackfor-puerto-ricos-independent-powers/.
125. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1867-68 (2016).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Denniston, Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes, supra note 121.
129. Id.
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governing powers of the Commonwealth.130 The Court in Sanchez-Valle
described Puerto Rico’s establishment, and drafting of their Constitution,
noting that the “constitutional developments were of great significance.”131
However, the implications of the Court’s decision in that case are in fact
limiting to the Commonwealth, just as the decision in Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust. The Supreme Court’s decision to
exclude Puerto Rico from the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of Chapter 9
leaves Puerto Rico with little to do for itself in order to solve its financial
crisis.132 As indicated by Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion, without
access to a debt restructuring process, Puerto Rico is left to wait on
congressional action.133 More specifically, the dissenting opinion stated,
“Pre-emption cases may seem like abstract discussions of the appropriate
balance between state and federal power. But they have real world
consequences. Finding pre-emption here means that a government is left
powerless and with no legal process to help its 3.5 million citizens.”134
Based on the Court’s recent decisions regarding Puerto Rico, the future of
the Commonwealth is uncertain. What is certain is that the public utility
companies are in need of restructuring their debts, because without
adjusting their debts, the Commonwealth will be left without necessities for
everyday life.
V.

CONCLUSION

As quoted earlier, Justice Scalia said, “Congress. . . does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”135
However, it appears that Congress did alter the fundamental details of
municipal bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, in a provision that they provided
little explanation for.136 As a result, the Court was faced with the issue of
determining which reading of the statutory scheme Congress intended.137
The Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust has a significant impact on the future of
the public utility companies in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.138 The
Court determined that while Puerto Rico is excluded from Chapter 9 and
cannot authorize its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874.
Id.
See Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954.
Id.
Id.
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.
See Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1953.
Id. at 1945.
Id. at 1954.
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Commonwealth is also preempted from creating its own bankruptcy laws in
order for the municipalities to restructure their debts.139 The Court found
that the amended definition of “state” to exclude Puerto Rico from defining
who may be a debtor was not so broad as to exclude Puerto Rico from the
preemption provision.140 As a result of the Court’s decision, the
Commonwealth is now limited to waiting on congressional action for relief
from its debts.141
BRITTNEY E. CIARLO

139. Id. at 1942.
140. Id.
141. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954.
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